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Abstract
Following Nocke and Yeaple (2012), we develop a model to explain how firms
allocate their organizational capital to different products. Using the Chinese
export and tax rebate data, we find that the reduction of export tax rebate
causes contraction of product scope , and the less competitive products are
more likely to be dropped.
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1. Introduction
Recent development in trade literature has shifted the focus to the multi-
product firms’ performance in markets (Bernard et al., 2010, 2011; Eckel
and Neary, 2006; Nocke and Yeaple, 2008, 2012; Manova and Zhang, 2012).
Multi-product firms produce goods varying not only in quality, but also with
different factor intensity (Song and Zhu, 2011). Bernard et al. (2010) find
that the product factor intensities vary substantially for a multi-product firm
and trade liberalization leads firms to drop their least successful products.
Using Belgian manufacturing firm-level data, Fuss and Zhu (2012) show that
about 30% of manufacturing firms produce goods in more than one 4-digit
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NACE code industries, and trade liberalization results in faster TFP growth
in comparative-advantage industries.
Our model illustrates the way how multi-product firms manage their prod-
uct scope in response to the reduction of export tax rebate (ETR). In particu-
lar, firms allocate their organizational capital among different products. The
product-level organizational capital, cost parameter, along with firm-level ef-
ficiency jointly determines the firm-product-level profit. The model suggests
that the reduction of ETR causes product scope contraction, and the prod-
uct of higher cost is more likely to be dropped. Our result is supported
by the Chinese export data. Our result makes an additional contribution
to the literature on multi-product firms and product-level heterogeneity in
factor intensity1. To the best of our knowledge, similar studies are scant-
y in the literature. Two related studies are Nocke and Yeaple (2012) and
Manova and Zhang (2012), who investigate the product scope adjustment
of multi-product firms. However, the former neglects the heterogeneity in
factor intensity across products, and the data limitation prevents them from
further exploring the extensive margin changes; the latter introduces quality
differentiation across products, but no explanations on why firms differenti-
ate their product quality ex ante and drop their low quality product ex post
are provided.
Our findings shed light on the determinant of extensive margin adjust-
ment of export firms. It is found that the reduction of ETR forces export
firms to drop their less competitive products. The extensive margin changes
further increase the aggregate TFP of export firms.
2. The Model
Each firm decides its product scope, price, and export status. Follow-
ing Nocke and Yeaple (2012), we assume that firms are heterogeneous in
organizational capital and organizational efficiency. The production of each
product requires labor, intermediate input and organizational capital. The
more organizational capital is used in the production, the lower the marginal
cost is, and the organizational efficiency determines the effectiveness of the
organizational capital in reducing the marginal cost. The production of each
1We interpret product-level heterogeneity of factor intensity as product-level difference
in comparative advantage.
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product needs a fixed cost in each period. A representative firm’s production
function for product ω is
Q = θωl
αωm1−αω (1)
where θω = k
θ
ω is the productivity of product ω, which is determined by
the organizational capital kω allocating to product ω, the firm specific or-
ganizational efficiency θ. The total organizational capital is fixed at Kθ
(
∑
ω kω = Kθ) for the firm. l and m are the labor and intermediate inputs,
respectively. The parameter αω is labor share. We assume that producing
product ω requires at least one unit of organizational capital. The marginal
cost of product ω is
c(kω, θ, zω) =
{
zωk
−θ
ω , if kω ≥ 1;
∞, if otherwise. (2)
zω = w
1−αω
m w
αω
l
[(
1− αω
αω
)αω
+
(
αω
1− αω
)1−αω]
(3)
where wl and wm are prices for labor and intermediate input, respectively.
zω is called cost parameter.
The consumers in the domestic and foreign markets have identical pref-
erence over varieties and take the CES form:
U =
[∫
Ω
x
σ−1
σ
ω dω
] σ
σ−1
(4)
where xω is the consumption of product ω, and σ > 1 is the substitution elas-
ticity between products. We assume that the intermediate input can freely
flow between the domestic and foreign markets, and so the two markets have
the same intermediate price level. L and L∗ are populations in the domes-
tic and foreign markets, respectively. wlL and w
∗
l L
∗ are the corresponding
aggregate incomes. The domestic and foreign demand functions generated
by the preference are xω = Ap(ω)
−σ and x∗ω = A
∗p∗(ω)−σ, where p(ω) (or
p∗(ω)) is the price in the domestic (or foreign) market, and A (or A∗) is the
corresponding residual demand in the domestic (or foreign) market which
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can be written as 2
A =
(1− β)wlL
M
[∫
p(Kθ, θ, z)−(σ−1)dG(Kθ, θ, z)
]
A∗ =
(1− β∗)w∗l L∗
M∗
[∫
p∗(Kθ, θ, z)−(σ−1)dG(Kθ, θ, z)
]
The parameter β (β∗) is the firm-level exit probability in the domestic (or
foreign) market, and M (or M∗) measures the number of potential entrants
in the domestic (or foreign) market. The equilibrium is solved by backward
induction.
The third stage: The representative firm chooses optimal prices in
the domestic and foreign markets. That is, p(kω, θ, zω) =
σ
σ−1c(kω, θ, zω),
p∗(kω, θ, zω) = σσ−1c
∗(kω, θ, zω) and c∗(kω, θ, zω) = τc(kω, θ, zω) where τ is per
unit iceberg trade cost, τ > 1.
The second stage: The firm decides the product scope. For ω to be
produced, two conditions must be satisfied. First, the profit obtained from
ω must be non-negative. The profit is given by
pi(kω, θ, zω) =
1
σ − 1
(
σ
σ − 1
)−σ
A˜(zωk
−θ
ω )
1−σ − fω (5)
where A˜ is the aggregate residual demand in the domestic and foreign mar-
kets, and fω is the fixed production cost. Second, the marginal profits of all
products ω must be identical.3 That is, ∂pii
∂ki
=
∂pij
∂kj
. Identical export decision
among all products 4 implies
ki
kj
=
(
z˜j
z˜i
) 1
(σ−1)θ−1
where z˜i = z
1−σ
i . Therefore, a firm will allocate more organizational capital
to products of lower cost parameter z.
2M/(1−β) (or M/(1−β∗)) is the mass of active firms in the domestic (or foreign) mar-
ket.
∫
p(k, θ, z)−(σ−1)dG(Kθ, θ, z) (or
∫
p∗(k, θ, z)−(σ−1)dG(Kθ, θ, z)) is the price index in
the domestic (or foreign) market.
3 Our analysis is for firms with θ < 1(σ−1) , which guarantees the concavity of the
organizational capital. For firms with θ > 1(σ−1) , it will only produce one product with
the lowest cost parameter z.
4The entry cost is in the firm-level.
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Lemma 1. Suppose z1 < z2 < · · · < zN and N is the integrity part of Kθ.
The optimal product scope N∗ is given by
N∗ = sup
n∈{1,2,··· ,N}
{n : z˜nk[(σ−1)θ−1]n ≥ z˜1k[(σ−1)θ−1]1 } (6)
where
kn =
Kθ
Z
(
z˜1
z˜n
) 1
[(σ−1)θ−1]
, Z =
N∗∑
n=1
(
z˜1
z˜n
) 1
[(σ−1)θ−1]
Lemma 2. If the mean of the fixed cost fω is the same for all ω ∈ Ω, then
the product-level profit is negatively correlated to its cost parameter.
The first stage: The Firm makes the market entry decision. The free
entry conditions are that the total discounted profit is equal to the fixed entry
cost, i.e.,
∫
Θ
V (Kθ, θ, z)dG(Kθ, θ, z) = Fe and
∫
Θ
V ∗(Kθ, θ, z)dG(Kθ, θ, z) =
F ∗e for domestic and foreign markets, respectively.
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Lemma 3. N∗ is increasing in the total organizational capital stock K.
It implies that firms with more capital choose larger product scope.
Proposition 1. When τ rises, firms contract their product scope and hence
the products of higher cost parameter are more likely to be dropped.
3. The Impact of Export Tax Rebate on Firm’s Product Scope
The reduction of ETR is similar to an increase in trade cost,6 which
reduces the export profit of each product, and further reduce firm-level total
profit in foreign market. By proposition 1, the reduction of ETR causes
firm-level product scope contraction and dropping of high cost products.
5V (Kθ, θ, z) =
∑
ω∈Ω
1
σ−1A(zωk
−θ
ω )
(1−σ)−fω
1−β . V
∗(Kθ, θ, z) =
∑
ω∈Ω
1
σ−1A
∗(zωk−θω )
(1−σ)
1−β∗ .
6The reduction of ETR, hence the increase in trade cost , is unbalanced among different
products
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Table 1: The Percentile of Firms Exporting Different Number of Products
Number of Products Percentile of
Ordinary Trade
Percentile of
Full Sample
1 32.7% 32.9%
2 16.9% 17.1%
3 10.4% 10.6%
4 7.0% 7.2%
> 4 32.9% 32.1%
3.1. Data
We collect the data of ETR rate for the comprehensive Chinese export
sectors in 2003 and 2004, and carefully merge the data with Chinese Customs
data using the 8-digit HS code. In 2004, the ETR reform reduces the average
ETR rate by about 30% to adjust the structure of export and the rebate
payment default.
Table 1 shows that about 70% of firms7 export more than one product
at 4-digit HS code level in the same year.
3.2. Empirical Evidence
The following regression is used to test the prediction of scope contraction
in response to the reduction of ETR.
num diffi = β0 + β1tax diffi + β2os di + εi (7)
where num diffi is the difference of firm i’s product scope between 2003 and
2004, tax diffi is the difference of firm i’s revenue-weighted ETR,
8 and os di
is the ownership dummy controlling for the effect of firm-type. The results
are in Table 2.
The results after controlling for firm-type imply that firms experiencing
larger ETR reduction cut more products.
Next, we estimate a Probit regression to see if higher cost products are
more likely to be dropped.
Pr(exitij = 1) = Pr(β1rcaj + β2tax diffi + β2os di + εij > 0) (8)
7In the following analysis we only keep the export firms engaging in the ordinary trade
in our sample as the firms involving in processing trade might react differently when facing
the export rebate changes.
8We use the figures in 2004 subtracting the figures in 2003, e.g. num diffi = num2004−
num2003 and tax diffi = taxdiff
2004
i − taxdiff2003i
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Table 2: The Extensive Margin
num diff Coef Coef
tax diff 0.24 (0.034) -0.11 (0.033)
Cons -2.39 (0.048) 0.16 (6.09)
Control for Ownership No Yes
Table 3: The Intensive Margin
exit Coef Coef
rca -0.19 (0.05) -0.23 (0.05)
tax diff -0.29 (0.66) -0.34 (0.65)
Cons -2.49 (0.07) -0.89 (0.57)
Control for Ownership No Yes
where exitij is a dummy variable which takes value 1 if the jth product of
firm i is dropped, otherwise takes value 0, rcaj is the relative comparative
advantage index of Chinese firms9 which is a proxy for cost parameters z,
and tax diffi and os di are the difference of firm i’s revenue-weighted ETR
and the ownership dummies, respectively.
Table 3 reports the results of the Probit regression. It indicates that high-
er cost products are more likely to be dropped in response to the reduction
of ETR. The pattern is line with the model prediction.
4. Conclusion
In this paper we extend the seminal work of Nocke and Yeaple (2012) and
develop a model to explain how multi-product firms contract their product
scope in response to a trade cost increment. When the trade cost increases,
firms will drop their less competitive products to release organizational,
and reallocate the organizational capital to other products. Our theory
9This index is given by rcaj = (
xij
xi
)/(
xj
x ) where xij denotes the export product j by
country i, xi denotes the total export of country i, xj is the total worldwide export of
product j, and x represent the total worldwide export. We assume that China is intensive
in labor, and the foreign country is intensive in capital. As such the wage is relatively
lower in China (wl < wm) than that in the foreign country (w
∗
l > w
∗
m = wm). The sectors
with larger labor share, α, are relatively more competitive (lower z) than those with lower
labor share (higher z).
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is supported by the empirical evidence from China. An important policy
implication of the results is that the reduction of the ETR makes export
firms drop their less competitive products, which increases firm-level TFP.
5. Appendix (For Reviewers)
Proof of (2). A firm minimizes wll+wmm subject to the constraint θωl
αωm1−αω =
1. The first-order conditions imply m
l
= wl
wm
1−αω
αω
. The optimal labor and in-
termediate inputs are
m =
(
wl
wm
1− αω
αω
)αω 1
θω
,
l =
(
wm
wl
αω
1− αω
)1−αω 1
θω
.
Therefore the minimized cost is c = zωk
−θ
ω where zω is defined by (3).
Proof of (5). The profit from product ω is
pi(kω, θ, zω) = [p(kω, θ, zω)− c(kω, θ, zω)]Ap(kω, θ, zω)−σ
+ [p∗(kω, θ, zω)− c∗(kω, θ, zω)]A∗p∗(kω, θ, zω)−σ
− fω
=
1
σ − 1
(
σ
σ − 1
)−σ
A˜(zωk
−θ
ω )
(1−σ) − fω
where A˜ = (A+ δωτ
1−σA∗). If the firm exports product ω, δω = 1. Otherwise
δω = 0. As the profits in the domestic and foreign markets are strictly
positive after paying the fixed production cost fω, the firm will choose to
export all products or choose not to export any product. The decision is
determined by the entry cost in the foreign market.
Proof of Lemma 1.
∑
kω = Kθ implies
k1 +
(
z˜1
z˜2
) 1
(σ−1)θ−1
k1 + · · ·+
(
z˜1
z˜N∗
) 1
(σ−1)θ−1
k1 = Kθ
Obviously
k1 =
Kθ
Z
, kn =
Kθ
Z
(
z˜1
z˜n
) 1
(σ−1)θ−1
(A1)
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for n = 2, · · · , N∗, where Z = ∑N∗n=1 ( z˜1z˜n) 1(σ−1)θ−1 .
When we rank the cost parameter in the form of z1 < · · · < zN , the N∗th
product is of the highest cost parameter among all produced products. The
marginal profits obtained from N∗th product must be equal to the marginal
profits obtained from any other products. Therefore, N∗ must satisfy (6).
Proof of Lemma 2. For convenience, we denote the product-level profit
pi(kω, θ, kω) by piω for ω ∈ Ω. The expected profit of products i, j ∈ Ω are
Epii =
1
σ − 1
(
σ
σ − 1
)−σ
A˜(zik
−θ
i )
(1−σ) − f,
Epij =
1
σ − 1
(
σ
σ − 1
)−σ
A˜(zjk
−θ
j )
(1−σ) − f,
which implies
Epii + f
Epij + f
=
(zik
−θ
i )
1−σ
(zjk
−θ
j )
1−σ =
(
zj
zi
) 1−σ
(σ−1)θ−1
under (A1). If zi < zj, then
Epii+f
Epij+f
> 1 which implies Epii > Epij.
Proof of Lemma 3. Suppose N∗ is decreasing in Kθ. When Kθ increases
and N∗ decreases, (A1) implies k1 will increase to k′1. Then
z˜N∗k
(σ−1)θ−1
N∗ ≥ z˜1k(σ−1)θ−11 > z˜1k′ (σ−1)θ−11
The inequality implies that product N∗ should be produced to maximize
the firm’s profit. It means N∗ does not fall when the Kθ increases. By
contradiction, N∗ is increasing in Kθ.
Proof of Proposition 1. Let Γω , 1σ−1
(
σ
σ−1
)−σ
(zωk
−θ
ω )
(1−σ). Then Epiω =
Γω(A+ τ
1−σA∗)− f . It follows that ∂Epiω
∂τ
= −(σ− 1)Γωτ−σA∗ < 0. Given τ ,
for any i, j ∈ Ω, suppose zi < zj. Lemma 2 implies Epii > Epij or Γi > Γj.
Let τ ∗ be defined by Epij = 0 or equivalently Γj(A + τ ∗1−σA∗) − f = 0. It
implies A + τ ∗1−σA∗ = f
Γj
. Conditional on τ = τ ∗, the expected profit of
product i is Epii = Γi
f
Γj
− f > 0 because of Γi > Γj.
Let τ rise from τ0 < τ
∗. Initially Epii > 0 and Epij > 0, which imply both
of them are kept on average. When τ rises to τ ∗, Epii > 0 and Epij = 0. It
follows, on average, that the product j will be dropped and the product i is
kept.
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